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INTRODUCTION.
e purpose of this policy brief is to analyze the role and the relevance of multilateral 
development banks, especially the regional development banks. To this end, we rst 
emphasize those factors that justify the existence of such banks and assess the role they have 
played since their inception. Taking into consideration the lessons derived from past 
experience, the current favorable economic climate in Latin America, and the existence of 
new funding mechanisms unavailable in the past, we also identify the main challenges that 
face regional banks, beginning with the lag in key economic indicators, such as insucient 
growth, low savings, investment and productivity rates, as well as the high levels of inequality 
and social exclusion; all of which inhibit achieving a more stable, sustainable and higher 
quality pattern of development.
In this context, beyond the question of allocation of nancial resources, it is imperative to 
redene the purposes and objectives of development banks in Latin America. is entails 
implementing more eective measures related to knowledge transfer and technical support, 
as well as applying innovative catalytic instruments to generate more economic and social value.
 
THE EVOLUTION OF MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.
An analysis of the role of development banks at the regional level must start with the 
fundamentals for the creation of such institutions, many times questioned under the 
assumption, in developed economies, that the market itself can solve the problems of 
resource allocation.
Multilateral development banks have traditionally been important not only for their role as 
instruments of economic development support, but also for their anti-cyclical and catalytic 
roles, particularly during periods of crisis. is is due to insucient internal savings and 
long-term nancing that hinder the achievement of stable, sustainable and balanced 
economic development. 
At their inception, the main objective of multilateral banks was to attract long-term external 
resources and channel them into the funding of new investment, mainly in infrastructure. 
Since then, their role has been evolving in response to the always changing reality that Latin 
American countries have faced and, in the process, broadening their scope of action to 
include a diversity of sectors and activities.
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Indeed, beyond the original model of the World Bank as a global development bank, over the 
years dierent initiatives and institutional models have emerged at the regional, sub-regional 
or national level, in response to new geopolitical and socio-economic realities.
Other important reasons that justify the creation of regional development banks and also 
explain their comparative advantages include a closer proximity to their clients and a broad 
knowledge of – and familiarity with – the idiosyncrasies of the region in which they operate. 
Nonetheless, their success has relied to a great extent on their capacity to articulate a vision 
of development, to dene a clear mission, and to obtain the solid commitment of their 
member countries to that mission, as well as to have the ability to mobilize external resources 
based on their institutional strength, both administrative and nancial. 
Multilateral development banks are one of the most signicant institutional inventions of the 
20th century. In 1944, the World Bank was created and initially was called the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Its goal was to help rebuild the 
economies of Europe and Japan after World War II, with an additional mandate to promote 
economic growth in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Since the 
beginning of its operations until the early 1960s, the IBRD focused its eorts mainly in the 
energy and transportation sectors. In turn, it created the International Finance Corporation 
as an instrument to support the private sector.
e Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was created in 1959 with the United States, 
Latin America and the Caribbean countries as founding members. It began operations in 
1960 under the presidency of Felipe Herrera, and was the world’s rst regional development 
bank. In the late 1960s, Canada joined as a member. Later, during the presidency of Antonio 
Ortiz Mena, the IDB expanded its membership to include European and Asian countries. 
Since its inception, the institutional model of the IDB, like that of the World Bank, has been 
based on two groups of shareholders, one made up of borrowers (developing countries), and 
the other of donors (developed countries). e IDB was founded, in part, as an answer to 
Latin America’s need for more funding for the social sector. However, although little known, 
one of the most important arguments for its creation – and one which helped overcome 
resistance to its founding – was the need for a nancial organization capable of meeting the 
needs of the region’s private sector.
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During the Bank’s rst decade of operations under the umbrella of the Alliance for Progress 
established between the United States and Latin America during the administration of 
President John F. Kennedy, the IDB ventured into sectors hitherto not given priority by the 
World Bank in the area of social development; notably the nancing of projects in education, 
potable water supply, sewer systems, and healthcare, as well as comprehensive agricultural 
and rural development programs. Support for regional integration was another important 
focus, as emphasized by its rst president Felipe Herrera, who dened the IDB as the 
integration bank.
Although at the beginning the IDB made loans without sovereign guarantees directly to the 
private sector, in accordance with its Charter, unsuccessful experiences on a few projects were 
a warning sign for the Bank. As a result, in its second decade of operations, the IDB stopped 
granting loans without sovereign guarantees, relying instead on a network of national 
development banks in the region to provide support to small and medium-size private 
enterprises through global credit lines. e Bank only directly supported larger private sector 
projects, provided they had governmental guarantees.
During the 1960s, the integration processes in Latin America experienced a major boom, 
creating a favorable environment for the emergence of new multilateral initiatives in the 
region. In this context, inspired by the founding of the IDB, and with its support, 
sub-regional institutions were created, such as the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (1961), the CAF (1968), the Caribbean Development Bank (1969), and the 
Financial Fund for the Rio de la Plata Basin, FONPLATA (1969).
e Development Bank of Latin America – CAF – was created by an agreement among the 
governments of Bolivia, Chile,1 Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and began 
operations in 1970 with the objective of becoming a nancial instrument to support 
integration within the Andean Group. us, during its rst 10 years, the institution primarily 
nanced projects that mainly involved small businesses within the framework of the 
industrial programming agreements established by the governing bodies of the Andean 
Group in order to encourage Andean production and exports.
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Following the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s, multilateral banks introduced 
major changes in the nancing policies of Latin American countries with balance of 
payments problems and played an important role in providing additional funding to heavily 
indebted countries. is was done through structural adjustment loans and other 
countercyclical programs that were conditioned on certain policy and institutional reforms.
In this international environment and following the same trend as other multilateral 
institutions, CAF approved a new operational policy that broadened its eld of action to 
include new sectors and new activities, not necessarily related to the Andean Group’s 
industrial programming agreements. It expanded its presence in the Andean countries with 
nancial products designed to help mitigate the serious crisis faced by the region. CAF also 
played an important role in nancing trade between the Andean countries when, as a result 
of the recession, traditional nancing channels from commercial banks were completely 
closed and demand for nancing investment projects had declined substantially. With this, 
the institution took a rst step to becoming not only the funding arm of the Andean 
integration process, resulting from industrial programming agreements, but also a major 
supporter of a more comprehensive economic development agenda within its shareholder countries.
In the early 1990s, in the midst of structural reform processes undertaken by most Latin 
American countries under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus and with the backdrop 
of new nancial crises in Mexico, Brazil and other countries, both the World Bank and the 
IDB continued to support structural adjustment policies through fast-disbursement loans. 
e Banks focused their investment funding primarily on programs and projects in 
education, health, and social protection, as well as state modernization programs. Both 
institutions gave high priority to poverty reduction and social inclusion.
As a result, the support by the World Bank and the IDB for infrastructure projects decreased 
in relative terms, under the assumption that, with the policy reforms undertaken by the 
countries in the region, funding for these investments would come mainly from the private 
sector. However, in recent years, both the IDB and the World Bank have again emphasized 
infrastructure nancing due to failures to achieve the expected results from the reformist 
policies of the 1990s. Similarly, the creation of the Inter-American Investment Corporation 
and the Private Sector Department aimed at directly supporting the private sector, as well as 
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the Multilateral Investment Fund, are some signicant additions to the institutional strength 
of the IDB.
In parallel with the shift in orientation of nancing by the World Bank and IDB, CAF 
established policies at the beginning of the decade to diversify its nancing programs. us, 
faced with a unique window of opportunity in the area of infrastructure nancing, CAF 
resolved to decisively venture into this sector, and in 1992, it launched a bold plan to support 
infrastructure and cross-border integration projects. e bank focused its activities on 
projects that promised eective international interconnection, especially roads, as well as 
energy and telecommunication networks. In addition, CAF launched initiatives in other 
critical sectors aimed at boosting development, such as the social sector, the environment, 
competitiveness, and public and private institution-building. It also decided to increase support 
for the private sector through structured nancing and other catalytic nancing operations.
In terms of counter-cyclical nancing, as a result of the most recent crises at the end of the 
rst decade of the new millennium and over the last ve years, CAF, like other multilateral 
institutions, introduced new programs that have had a major impact, such as contingent 
credit lines and broad sector-wide loan programs, in addition to substantial increases in credit 
lines to the private banking system for trade nance and working capital. In the catalytic 
domain, the use of guarantees, partial guarantees, greater use of structured nance, 
subordinated loans, and equity investments in funds and companies are some of the products 
with which CAF has been increasingly supporting the region’s development in recent years. 
If there is one outstanding feature in the evolution of major regional development banks, it 
is the growth of their intellectual capacity and research capabilities to assist member countries 
to produce coherent and eective economic and social development policies – an activity 
that, until the late 1980s, was mainly exercised by the World Bank, the OECD and similar 
institutions in the developed world, and at the regional level mainly by ECLAC (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). e IDB strengthened its research and 
knowledge-generation capabilities, especially beginning in the late 1980s under the 
leadership of its (current) president Enrique Iglesias who, as a former Executive Secretary of 
ECLAC for several years, brought to the institution the knowledge-generation tradition that 
was nurtured in ECLAC from the time of Raul Prebisch. Following this successful example, 
in the mid-1990s CAF also began to reinforce its intellectual capacity and applied research 
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capabilities. Today, it has a well-earned reputation in this area as a result of its work and 
eective contributions.
In summary, support from multilateral banks through lending, technical assistance, and 
other programs has played a very important role in the development process of Latin America 
– and will continue to do so.
CAF: FROM SUB-REGIONAL ANDEAN BANK TO DEVELOPMENT BANK OF LATIN AMERICA
As an interesting example of a regional institution that is owned by emerging countries, and 
therefore dierent in this aspect from the IDB and most regional development banks 
worldwide, it is worth underscoring some of the key factors that have characterized CAF’s 
development and transformation.
Institutional Evolution
Over the past 20 years, CAF has grown from ve shareholder countries to eighteen. In 
addition to the founding members Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, its 
shareholders now include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Spain, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, as well as 
14 private banks in the region. In addition, an amendment to CAF’s Articles of Agreement 
that entered into force in 2008, permitted other countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean to become full members at the same level as the Andean founders, an option 
exercised by Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
CAF began operations with an authorized capital of US$100 million and a subscribed capital 
of US$25 million. Today,2 the bank’s authorized capital is US$10 billion, while paid-in 
capital plus reserves from retained earnings (net worth) is more than US$6.8 billion. e 
assets of the institution increased from US$160 million at its inception to about US$25 
billion today. Two capital increases, which were subscribed by the member countries in the 
last three years, totaling US$6.3 billion, will allow CAF to more than double the paid-in 
capital and nancing operations over the next ve years.
2. 2014.
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e increase of CAFs lending to shareholder countries has witnessed a similar expansion. In 
its rst 10 years of existence, CAF approved operations whose total value was US$600 
million, for an annual average of US$60 million. In only the last ve years (2008-2012), total 
approvals have amounted to US$47 billion.
Likewise, since the 1990s, CAF signicantly expanded its nancing scope to include 
infrastructure, social development, environmental protection, capital markets development, 
support to industrial activities, mining and tourism, and institution-building – both in the 
public and private sectors. In the early 1990s, about 40% of CAF’s loan portfolio was made 
up of trade nance operations, and the rest were program and project loans. Currently, over 
85% of the portfolio consists of programs and projects in the above-mentioned sectors.
CAF is the main source of multilateral nancing for the ve founding member countries and 
has become one of the most important sources for all of Latin America, together with the 
IDB and the World Bank. Indeed, while CAF accounted for less than 5% of multilateral 
nancing in the region in the 1980s, today it provides about 30% of that funding and, most 
notably, has taken over the top spot in recent years in terms of approved nancing for 
infrastructure development, including energy. At the same time, CAF has become a relevant 
player in nancing the private sector.
Moreover, in recent years, the institution has signicantly increased its participation in 
nancing the social sector, the environment, and the promotion of micro-, small, and 
medium-sized enterprises, both directly and through a network of public and private 
nancial institutions and specialized funds established for this purpose. It has also intensied 
its advisory activities and nancial structuring, as well as its use of catalytic instruments, such 
as partial guarantees, co-nancing, structured nancing of projects, subordinated loans, and 
participation in investment funds, to name a few.
One area in which CAF has consolidated its leadership is regional integration. Over the past 
10 years, it has technically, institutionally, and nancially supported the execution of more 
than 60 projects involving physical cross-border integration, with a total investment of about 
US$30 billion and direct funding surpassing US$8 billion. ese projects were mainly 
related to roads, transportation, communications, energy, logistics, and the environment, as 
well as other comprehensive initiatives of cross-border development.
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In terms of borrowing in international capital markets, CAF has had an extremely interesting 
evolution. Until the early 1990s, CAF operated mainly with capital contributed by its 
members and with short-term and medium-term external funding provided by 
export-import banks and development agencies in industrialized countries. Currently, over 
85% of CAF’s external funding is obtained from the capital markets and from international 
banks. In the last ve years alone, CAF has completed 50 bond issues in 10 countries, raising 
more than US$7 billion, and implemented a commercial paper program in the 
neighborhood of US$25 billion.
All this has been possible because of the bank’s consistently solid nancial position over the 
years, which led to CAF obtaining its rst investment grade credit rating at BBB in 1993 and 
13 consecutive rating upgrades since then. In the second half of 2012 and the rst quarter of 
2013, Standard and Poor’s, Moody's, and Fitch raised CAF’s credit rating to AA- or 
equivalent, while the Japan Ratings Agency upgraded CAF to AA; ratings that are 
substantially higher than those of its shareholder members and that give CAF a competitive 
edge in capital markets.
In parallel to the geopolitical decision to keep more than 90% of its equity in the hands of 
countries in the region, CAF has strengthened its Latin American dimension, but at the same 
time has progressed in building bridges of cooperation with the rest of the world in ways that 
do not aect its distinctive characteristics or its Latin American identity. Accordingly, beyond 
its presence in international nancial markets, CAF has signed cooperation agreements with 
countries outside the region and around the world, including development banks, export 
agencies, and research and technical cooperation centers of various countries from the 
Southern hemisphere, and in Europe and Asia.
Also, through its knowledge-generation agenda, the institution has positioned itself as a 
forum for regional and international debate on Latin American development issues and has 
achieved important links with leading think tanks and academic communities worldwide.
THE KEYS TO CAF’S TRANSFORMATION. 
In light of the information presented on the evolution of CAF, a valid question is: How was 
it possible to achieve all this?
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First, the transformation of CAF has been the combined result of strong support from its 
shareholders, through continuous and substantial increases in capital, impeccable debt 
service by member countries, strict compliance with all contractual obligations, and 
non-interference with the institution’s professional management.
But there is more to it than that. Indeed, the fact that CAF is essentially a Latin 
American-owned institution – which at rst glance might seem to be a limiting factor for 
growth, given the absence of AAA and AA rated countries from the industrialized world as is 
the case of the IDB and similar institutions that provide nancial resources – has been a 
determining factor of success.
In this context, it is worth examining the main strategic components that have contributed 
to the strong support for the bank on a wide range of issues, such as CAF’s vision of the 
development process, its elds of action, its policies, products and services, as well as the 
characteristics of its governance system. Six factors have been critical to the transformation of 
the institution and are worth emphasizing, as follows.
A Visionary Founding Document.
A rst factor concerns the visionary and pragmatic approach of CAF’s Articles of Agreement, 
which, in fact, has become the cornerstone enabling CAF to reinvent itself periodically to 
respond and adjust to changing scenarios and conditions in the geopolitical, economic and 
social realms, both globally and regionally. A good example is the decision, made in the early 
1990s, to open its capital to other members in Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
allowed CAF to extend its vocation for regional integration and its operational base beyond 
the Andean borders. It is worth mentioning that a key element for the incorporation of new 
countries was precisely the emphasis given to sustainable development and regional 
integration in CAF’s mission statement, which was updated in 1993. us, the emphasis on 
physical interconnection and cross-border development at CAF proved to be a big attraction 
to non-founding member countries that have joined the institution since the 1990s.
Embracing a Comprehensive Development Agenda.
e comprehensive development agenda that CAF adopted in the early 1990s as a guide and 
orientation for its operations, which is periodically updated accordingly to the dynamic 
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evolution of global and regional conditions, is a signicant factor that has contributed to 
CAF’s transformation. 
is updated agenda aims to achieve fast, sustained, sustainable, and high-quality economic 
growth: fast growth, in order to bridge the development gap with respect to high-income 
countries; sustained growth, to avoid volatility and ensure the continuity of economic 
progress and social welfare; ecient growth, to allow for a productive transformation and a 
competitive expansion in international markets; equitable growth, to permit a fair and 
inclusive participation for a majority of citizens; and, sustainable growth, to ensure the 
permanence of the region’s human and natural capital from one generation to another, 
honoring cultural diversity and the environment.
To achieve these goals, CAF’s comprehensive development agenda promotes actions for 
economic growth that are aimed at reducing Latin America´s high reliance on exports of raw 
materials and its dependence on the volatile international economic environment, are based 
on a transformation of the economies to improve their productivity, add value to national 
comparative advantages, and that increase investment in all forms of capital: human, social, 
natural, physical, productive, and nancial. In this regard, regional integration with a 
pragmatic approach that allows the region to compete eectively in the global marketplace 
becomes a key strategic objective.
Based on this holistic view of the development process, broadening CAF’s scope of operations 
– which has expanded beyond the originally stated activities related to integration, regional 
trade, and infrastructure to include activities that address competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship, strengthening of nancial systems, social and environmental development, 
state modernization, democracy, governance, and public safety – has helped to strengthen the 
institution as a keystone in the region’s development.
Regional Identity.
e membership composition of the institution is another central factor worth emphasizing. 
During the mid-1990s CAF made a decision to maintain its regional identity. is means 
that countries in the region hold a large majority of shares and voting power, and that CAF 
does not have two categories of members: industrialized countries that are capital providers 
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not eligible to receive nancing, and developing countries that are the exclusive recipients of 
nancing. In fact, of CAF´s 18 shareholder countries, 16 are Latin American or Caribbean 
countries that, together, control 95% of the bank’s capital.
Competitive Access to International Capital Markets. 
In light of the decision highlighted above, it has been critical that all shareholder countries 
protect the institution’s health and nancial soundness. is is an essential ingredient to 
ensure that CAF attain the highest possible credit ratings, which allow the bank to tap into 
capital markets and other internal and external nancial sources, and to meet, in a sustainable 
way, the development needs of the region’s member countries and, thereby remain relevant. 
is creates a genuine sense of shared responsibility among member countries, leading to a 
high level of commitment to the success of the institution. us, the absence of donor 
countries from the developed world turns an apparent weakness into a strength by generating 
a sense of mutual loyalty. In fact, during CAF’s 40 years, no country has defaulted on any 
nancial, statutory, or other obligation.
In this context, beyond maintaining adequate nancial indicators and policies, it has been 
essential for CAF to attain and maintain a high level of paid-in capital relative to total capital. 
Unlike other institutions whose major shareholders include OECD countries with AAA or 
AA credit ratings, for institutions such as CAF – in which the majority of shareholder 
countries do not enjoy such credit scores – what is really important is not the guaranteed or 
callable capital, as in the case of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, or the IDB, 
but rather the paid-in capital and retained earnings. As described in a previous section, thanks 
to conservative policies and healthy nancial indicators, it was possible for CAF in the early 
1990s to attain an investment grade credit rating of BBB from the major rating agencies and, 
following 13 consecutive upgrades, it now enjoys AA- and AA ratings.
Corporate Governance.
Another important factor that has inuenced the dynamic and solid evolution of CAF is the 
existence of a non-resident and high-level board of directors, composed of ministers and 
senior government ocials that, in eect, are the same authorities as the Governors of the 
World Bank, the IDB and most multilateral institutions. Additionally, the fact that the 
voting system is “one director, one vote” regardless of the relative dierences in membership 
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by each shareholder – as is the case in the traditional model of multilateral banks – provides 
for a much more balanced decision-making system, one that is more exible and less prone 
to political inuence outside the specic activities and operations of the institution.
Another fundamental issue, which is closely linked to the one above, is the Board’s decision- 
making capacity on key issues in areas of strategy, policy, capitalization, the approval of plans, 
programs and annual budgets; as well as the review and approval of operating and nancial 
results. At the same time, this model of governance also involves a high level of delegated 
authority to management and the relevant committees on issues related to lending, 
operations and administration, which allows for objectivity, transparency, exibility and 
speed in decision-making. In this context, it is important to underline the absence of political 
or any other interference by shareholder countries in the management of the institution. is 
has guaranteed, at the same time, a high level of professionalism through a merit-based 
recruitment and promotion system.
Corporate Culture.
Finally, it is worth highlighting CAF’s philosophy of not trying to impose models or 
one-size-ts-all solutions on shareholder countries, as well as CAF’s corporate culture, which 
is predicated on full respect for ideological dierences, and the bank’s decision to be 
continuously present in all member countries, especially in times of crisis.
CAF has proved since its founding that it is a loyal and supportive partner. It is the banker 
who brings the umbrella even on sunny days when it is not needed, and opens it when it 
rains. Moreover, the institution has played an important catalytic role, raising funds from 
other sources to channel them, along with its own resources, to nance projects and activities 
in the region. e ability to fulll this role is a critical factor for the success of any 
development bank.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE.
Given the analysis presented in the previous sections, let us explore the future direction of 
development banks in general and, in particular, of those banks operating in the region. 
What issues are seen as the main challenges in Latin America? How can regional development 
banks help address them?
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While it is true that generalities usually hide often important dierences, which set countries 
apart in important ways, it is still possible to highlight some phenomena that aect all 
countries at some level. Latin America has emerged relatively unscathed from the recent 
nancial crisis, with an average annual growth rate of 4% over the past ve years. is, 
however, leaves no room for complacency, given the complexity of the structural problems 
that the region must overcome. Indeed, Latin America must achieve sustained annual growth 
above 6% if it hopes to attain per capita income levels similar to those of industrialized 
countries in the next 25 years, while at the same time solving the problems of poverty and 
inequality in a sustainable manner.
To reach these goals, banks need to adopt a long-term vision and act to help solve problems 
and structural bottlenecks. To this end, it is necessary to emphasize some of the most urgent 
priorities in the region. 
First, exports of most Latin American countries remain highly concentrated and dependent 
on commodities, a situation that has been exacerbated by the recent boom in commodity 
prices due to high demand in Asia, especially in China. Consequently, one of the top 
priorities is a productive transformation of the economies in the region, through a shift from 
a model based on comparative advantages to a model based on competitive advantages: in 
other words, export diversication, both regionally and globally, with higher added value 
goods and services. is is one area of cooperation that should become a cornerstone for 
development banks. It will require action not only of a nancial nature, but of a more 
qualitative nature, as well.
Second, economic growth in recent years was not supported by sustained increases in 
investment levels. Rather, the gap between Latin America and other emerging economies 
widened in this regard. e average savings and investment rates in the region are 20% of 
GDP, less than half the rates of Asian countries and, therefore, insucient to produce annual 
growth rates above 6%. To achieve such a level of growth requires investment rates above 
27% of GDP. Reaching those rates will require an enormous eort in identifying, preparing, 
and implementing well-designed projects, as well as mobilizing both domestic and external 
savings. In terms of net capital inows, it is estimated that these would exceed US$300 billion 
per year, which gives regional banks a major role in terms of direct and catalytic actions.
ird, the majority of Latin American countries do not rank high in terms of international 
LSE Global South Unit · Policy Brief Series
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk/globalsouth
Policy Brief No. 2/2015
15
competitiveness and productivity. According to indicators compiled by the World Economic 
Forum, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are generally relegated to the lower 
rungs of the ladder in both competitiveness and productivity. Development banks can be an 
eective instrument in assisting member countries to improve the quality of their 
infrastructure, of higher education, and job-training; as well as supporting eorts to achieve 
advances in science, technology, innovation, and institutional development. Currently, Latin 
America has inadequate infrastructure and is plagued with logistical problems, high 
transportation costs, inecient ports and customs clearance systems, not to mention 
signicant deciencies in health and educational services, both in terms of quantity and 
quality. Other persistent problems include missed opportunities in technology transfers 
through international trade, foreign direct investment, and licensing; as well as chronic 
institutional weaknesses in judicial systems and in the rule of law, in general.
Finally, a major challenge facing Latin America is closing the serious gaps in social equity.  
Indeed, despite the progress made in recent years, the problem is still critical since a third of 
Latin America's population lives in poverty and income distribution in the region continues 
to be the most skewed in the world. Similarly, it is imperative for the region to frame its 
development strategies within solid environmental parameters, especially given the increased 
vulnerability to pollution and global warming, and the rapid increase in natural disasters in 
the region – factors that conspire against eorts to promote sustained, comprehensive and 
widespread development. In the near future, development banks should further strengthen 
programs that contribute to these objectives.
FINAL THOUGHTS.
It is important to rearm the fundamental role played by multilateral development banks in 
Latin America, particularly regional banks. e question that frequently arises about the need 
for new regional banks, and even the question about the relevance of those that currently 
exist, can be answered simply: consider the investment and nancing needs of the region, if 
it hopes to achieve high and sustained growth rates that enable it to attain similar levels of per 
capita income as industrialized countries within 20 years, while at the same time achieving 
genuine inclusion and social equity.
Beyond the existing multilateral banks, there is room for the creation and/or strengthening 
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of other regional institutions. However, the viability and success of these initiatives will 
depend largely on their being built on solid foundations that combine a clear geopolitical and 
developmental vision with a rigorous but innovative technocratic approach.
e success of regional development banks will depend on their professional management, 
their nancial soundness, and their ability to attract global nancial resources; as well as their 
technical and intellectual capacity to promote comprehensive development agendas.
CAF, with over 40 years’ experience, is a good example in this regard: this institution has 
strengthened its operational and nancial capacity by adopting a comprehensive 
development agenda, expanding its membership, and diversifying its products and services, 
as well as through an eective positioning in international capital markets. e governance adopted 
since its inception has been, without a doubt, a decisive factor that facilitated its evolution.
Latin American countries are faced with the crucial challenge of achieving fuller development 
for their citizens. e institutional architecture of the region must support this task and, in 
the process, continue to improve its performance, especially with regards to knowledge 
services. at evolution should be guided not only by purely economic and nancial 
considerations, but also from the perspective of the positioning of Latin America in the 
context of globalization, through the revitalization, with more force than ever, of regional integration.
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